The concept of a tri-service batch training together and passing out as a batch has served to foster course spirit and deep ties. Under no circumstances should it be diluted.

The prime lesson to emerge from the Second World War was the critical need for synergy and jointness in operations. The dominant trend in that war was the thrust towards inter-services synergy and integration. Thus, the German Blitzkrieg synthesised the action of the Panzer Tank formations with the Stuka Dive Bombers (which virtually served as flying artillery). It was this air-land synergy that restored manoeuvre to pre-eminence on the battlefields. On the high seas, the aircraft carriers replaced the battleships as the decisive element in naval warfare. In the jungles of Burma, to counter the Japanese tactics of deep infiltration and encirclement, the Allies resorted to creating admin boxes that were maintained entirely by the air when cut off. Amphibious operations reflected the ultimate in inter-services synergy that went far beyond mere cooperation and entailed a very high level of joint planning and execution.

At the end of World War II, the British military leadership was acutely conscious of the need for inter-services synergy in modern warfare. So much so that Lord Louis Mountbatten and Field Marshal Auchinlek, when laying the foundations for the armed forces of free India, overwhelmingly emphasised on jointness. The National Defence Academy (NDA) and the Defence Services Staff College, therefore, were mooted as inter-services institutions and have done tremendous service in fostering jointness in the Indian armed forces. The NDA, in particular, was a unique and pioneering concept for it ushered in jointness at the very grass roots or the entry level itself. It thereby laid the foundations for Inter-services synergy. This was renewed at the Staff College at the mid-career level and reinforced at the National Defence College at the one star level. The peak of inter-services synergy was witnessed in the 1971 War for the liberation of Bangladesh. By 1991, a significant milestone was reached when all three service chiefs were from the first course NDA (then JSW). In the Kargil War, again all three chiefs were from the NDA, rendering a significant boost to inter-services synergy.

However, services the world over have a tendency to revert to turf wars and dissonance. The NDA was designed as an institution of excellence. To attract the brightest and best teaching staff in India, its first British Principal J.T.M. Gibson had raised the salaries of civilian instructors to virtually three times of what was then being paid in the best public schools. That is why the NDA attracted the cream of the best civilian teaching talent in the country in the 1950s and 1960s. Unfortunately, thereafter (at the stage of making them permanent) a Joint Secretary in the Ministry took the inexplicable decision to reduce the remuneration of civilian instructors to below that being earned by their peers in academic institutions, on the plea that they were only teaching undergraduates. This was a body blow to the NDA. Today, the NDA cannot attract decent staff at these meager pays. Result is: vacancies go unsubscribed and over 60 per cent of the civilian teaching staff in the NDA is employed on an ad-hoc basis. This has had a disastrous effect on teaching standards at this premiere institution. The armed forces must correct this drift and, if required (as an emergency measure), augment salaries from Service Welfare funds (in terms of an NDA allowance) to attract and retain the best talent in the country.

Another severe jolt to jointness has come in the form of the navy's recent decision to switch to a four-year B.Tech degree for all its entrants. Though the proposal has considerable merit, there is room for discussion and debate. IIT graduates and geeks may not always make the best combat leaders and war fighters. Generalists are needed to avoid tunnel vision and give the overviews and strategic direction. Physical fitness and a yen for combat may not always be the strong point of IIT/B.Tech graduates. In any case, the army and the air force are not on board on the decision to switch from BA/B.Sc courses entirely to the B.Tech stream.

The most deleterious effect of the decision lies in the implementation wherein naval graduates will complete only two years at the NDA and the balance two at the Naval Academy. The core concept of jointness-wherein army, navy and air force cadets join the academy together, train together for three years and then pass out as a course-stands broken. It has taken six decades to build the structures of jointness. Today, the need for jointness and synergy has become crucial and overriding. At its initiation, the NDA was an exciting concept, far ahead of its time. It was emulated by Australia and many developing countries. Today, we cannot afford to dilute the basic structures of jointness on the plea of each service going its own way. The army is already severely short of officers. Infantry and fighting arm officers have done well in combat without B.Tech degrees. Imposing B.Tech curricula will further restrict the number of applicants. Good outdoor oriented students from the arts or commerce streams would be lost. We need to tap this pool to get our fair share of the higher ability levels at the intake stage. There was a time when the NDA attracted the cream of the country's elite public schools. That sadly is no longer the case.

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