It goes to the eternal credit of the Indian soldier and officers that they defied crippling drawbacks and disadvantages to display raw courage and indomitable spirit

On July 26, the nation celebrated Vijay Diwas to raise a toast to the Indian Army's (IA) successes during the Kargil conflict. As candles were lit and TV channels flashed visuals of the celebrations at Dras, it became essential to understand the underlying rationale to this misadventure by Pakistan and the limitations and inadequacy of the Indian response. Many theories have been propounded on the rationale for Pakistan, more so when it had the portents of escalating into a larger conflagration of which Islamabad had sound reasons to be scared. One misconception was that the Indians were too cowardly and illorganised to offer any effective resistance.

Some other assessments made by Pakistan-such as lack of modernisation of the IA, the fatigue caused to it by decades of involvement in counter insurgency operations, shifting of troops from the Kargil sector for tasks in the Valley, shortage of officers, low budget allocations-may have contributed to the decision to stage the Kargil confrontation.

Pakistan's Operational Analysis

Though apprehensions of nuclear retaliation by Pakistan to any escalation of the conflict by India did not have any merit, but unfortunately, the Indian security establishment 'over time' conditioned itself to the validity of Islamabad's nuclear deterrence and the selfinduced assessment that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is controlled by its army which may be rash enough to press the button. During the 1990 standoff, Pakistan realised that its nuclear deterrence works well on India.

Failure to make any headway at Siachen had greatly frustrated the Pakistan Army, more so it's higher command. Towards the latter part of the 1980s, it started examining ways and means to drive the IA into a position where it would find itself in a Siachen like situation, as faced by Pakistan. Examination of the line of control (LoC) revealed an area where Pakistan could 'Siachen' India. Pervez Musharraf in his book In Line of Fire states that, "India captured a location where they felt that our presence was thin and vise versa. This is how they managed to occupy Siachen." The IA could suffer the failures and frustrations similar to what the Pakistan Army had been undergoing at the Saltaro range. In addition, movement on Srinagar-Leh road could be interrupted. This plan was no secret from the political executive, as Benazir Bhutto had stated that the plan was presented to her and she had vetoed it. Nawaz Sharif, too, had been fully briefed and the Indian establishment was being merely gullible in believing his assertions to the contrary.

India's Operational Assumptions

To understand the Kargil conflict one must know the military and terrain peculiarities of this part of the LoC, which falls amongst the highest snow fall regions of the Himalayas (Dosai Mountains). Patrolling of the area during this period in the past had resulted in heavy casualties where even platoon size patrols disappeared under snow avalanches and that had imposed restrictions on patrolling of the vacated areas. To add to this were the large gaps between defended posts, ranging from 10 to 25 km. At the same time, snow conditions made tactical intelligence collection impossible.

No large scale ingress by Pakistan could be expected across a well established LoC. It was India's stated policy that any aggression in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) would be considered an attack on India and that this country would respond accordingly. Large scale movement of troops and preparations would be picked up by the Indian intelligence and Indian troops would have the necessary advance warning. Terrain, too, did not favour large scale operations by Pakistan. Such were the reasonable assumptions. The fact that Pakistan did achieve complete surprise was the result of colossal failure of Indian intelligence.

Indian Reaction

Once the ingress surfaced, the security establishment retaliated with remarkable alacrity. The Indian Air Force (IAF), displaying reluctance to come on board, warned the government of escalation in the event of deployment of air power. But it was Pakistan which was scared of India escalating the conflict and, to that end, throughout kept denying the presence of its troops in the intrusion.

The then Chief of the Air Staff, General V.P. Malik, could not cut short his foreign tour, as reportedly no one had asked him to. Troops were thrust into battle without essential acclimatisation and reconnaissance in frontal attacks along knife edge ridges and steep slopes. When the IAF at last did go into action, the presence of stinger missile pushed its aircraft to greater heights, making acquisition and engagement of snow covered enemy positions difficult. Yet, its employment had a tremendous psychological impact.

However, for Air Commodore Jasjit Singh to claim, "exceptionally well executed aerial strikes by IAF provided an impetus-to the support of international community in favour of India rather than Pakistan" in Kargil 1999-Pakistan's Fourth War is to strain the reader's intelligence. Supporting artillery fire, too, was less helpful due to the nature of terrain, ever changing meteorological conditions and large time lag from lifting of fire and arrival of attacking troops.

Raw Courage, Indomitable Spirit

It goes to the eternal credit of the Indian soldier and officers that despite these crippling drawbacks and disadvantages, they displayed raw courage and indomitable spirit. While the capture of Tiger Hill, Tololing and other exploits have received much coverage, what is less known is that almost every inch that the Indian troops recaptured from the enemy involved the same level and degree of courage and effort.

Had the political executive in Pakistan not developed cold feet, diminishing the support to the intruding troops, not to mention American pressure on Pakistan to pull out, Indian casualties would have been far greater, tasks that much more difficult and perhaps full success much delayed.

 

 

Kargil reflected major gaps in intelligence
By Sangeeta Saxena

General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Chief of the Army Staff during the Kargil Operation

SP's Land Forces (SP's): Could the Kargil conflict have been avoided?

General (Retd) V.P. Malik (Malik): The 'intention' to wage a war comes before any war planning. The intention originates in the mind of the rulers.

In his book 'Four Wars One Assumption', Altaf Gauhar, a former Pakistani minister for information and broadcasting, stated that at the instance of General Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan Army had hatched a plan to launch an attack in Kargil in 1987. The plan was dropped on account of military and political inappropriateness. Pakistan Army under General Pervez Musharraf initiated the war apparently believing that nuclear balance between India and Pakistan permitted offensive actions to take place with impunity in Jammu and Kashmir (J & K).

Admiral J C Wylie in his papers 'Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power' has stated that "Despite whatever effort there may be to prevent it, there may be a war." Another assumption on war planning stated by the same author in the book is that 'we can not predict with certainty the pattern of war for which we prepare ourselves.' It has seldom been possible to forecast the time, the place, the scope, the intensity, and the general tenor of a conflict. Indo-Pakistan wars in 1947-48, 1965, and war with China in 1962 were neither anticipated nor could be avoided. In May 1999, the war in Kargil sector broke out within two months of the prime ministers of India and Pakistan signing the Lahore Declaration with much fanfare.

The best way for India to minimize chances of such conflicts would be to develop effective politico-military 'dissuasion' and 'deterrence' capabilities. Unfortunately, we have never been able to build that. That is why Pakistan, whose economic and military capabilities are far lower than India's, remains pro-active and despite several military defeats, has every time taken the initiative to start a war or proxy war.

SP's: What were the actual reasons for Pakistan having occupied the Kargil heights?

Malik: Pakistan Army launched this operation--attack by infiltration--and occupied some Kargil heights with a view to:-

• Altering the alignment of the Line of Control (LoC), east of the Zoji La and denying the use of the Srinagar-Kargil-Leh highway to India.
• Reviving jehadi terrorism in J & K.
• Capturing Turtuk, a strategically important village located on the southern bank of Shyok River in Ladakh through which an ancient trade route cuts through the Ladakh Range into the Northern Area of Pakistan. This would have adversely affected our positions in the central part of Siachen Glacier.
• Highlighting the Indo-Pak dispute over J & K to the international community.

SP's: Was Kargil war an intelligence failure?

Malik: The fact that India was completely surprised about the intrusion at political, strategic and tactical levels can not be denied. It reflected a major deficiency in our system of collecting, reporting, collating and assessing intelligence, as well as poor surveillance on the ground.

SP's: Has anyone been held responsible?

Malik: I can speak about the army and not other agencies. Yes, appropriate action was taken against army personnel considered responsible for surveillance and command lapses by various review committees.

SP's: Why was there a delay in the decision to use the Indian Air Force during the war?

Malik: The initial assessment was that the use of air power would escalate and enlarge the conflict. (Intelligence assessment, it may be noted, was that we were fighting Jehadi militants and not Pakistan Army. In actual fact, there were no Jehadi militants on the battlefield. This has been confirmed by all post war reports.) Consequently, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) did not allow its use. Later, when the intelligence and ground situations were reviewed and the Chiefs of Staff Committee recommended it on May 23, 1999, the CCS allowed its use so long as we did not cross the LoC. It was a matter of assessment: there was no delay in decision making.

SP's: What are the lessons India learnt from the Kargil war?

Malik: Some important strategic lessons that have emerged are as follows:

• Acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan has not reduced or eliminated the probability of a war between them
• We need to enhance border surveillance and close defense capability to prevent loss of territory in a surprise attack
• The new strategic environment calls for speedier, more versatile and more flexible combat organizations
• It is essential to keep military leadership within the security and strategic decisionmaking loop, and
• Information operations are important in the growing transparency of the battlefield.

SP's: Looking back, do you feel it could have been different?

Malik: I do wish that:

• We did not have intelligence and border surveillance lapses and we had declared Pakistan to be fully responsible for waging a war with India in Kargil sector.
• The armed forces were much better armed and equipped. Remember, during the war I said that 'We shall fight with whatever we have'.
• We had crossed the Line of Control at some points in J & K.

These reflections and wishes notwithstanding, I must add that the Kargil victory will go down in the history of India in general and the Indian armed forces in particular as a historic event. This saga will also be recounted as a symbol of great pride and inspiration, in all accounts of grit and determination displayed on the battlefield by the Indian Army. The main credit for achieving success in Kargil undoubtedly goes to the units who fought on the front.

 

 

Key lesson would be eternal vigilance
By Sangeeta Saxena

K. Subrahmanyam, Headed the Kargil Review Committee when it was instituted by the NDA government in 1999

SP's Land Forces (SP's): What were the major lessons learnt from the Kargil conflict?

K. Subrahmanyam (Subrahmanyam): The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) report was not an investigation into what happened at Kargil, but a review of the developments and recommendations as to the measures to be undertaken so as to prevent such an occurrence in the future. The report highlighted that it was a major intelligence failure and several recommendations were made to rectify the lacunae.

SP's: What did you see as the more substantive recommendations?

Subrahmanyam: Undoubtedly, the most important recommendation was about intelligence. There has been some headway in a sense with the creation of National Technical Reconnaissance Organisation and Defence Intelligence Agency. However, there are doubts whether that kind of intelligence culture has permeated into the services.

SP's: What about recommendations that are yet to be implemented?

Subrahmanyam: I would say that some, if not all, significant steps have been taken. There is another recommendation which was not a focused recommendation though, but was made on manpower policy. To my understanding, the issue has been taken up by the Sixth Pay Commission.

SP's: Home Minister P. Chidambaram has been regularly taking stock of the available intelligence. What more needs to be done?

Subrahmanyam: That certainly is an improvement, but it is not adequate. The Cabinet Committee on Security should meet at least every fortnight and should have one session of intelligence briefing at that point.

SP's: Do you feel the role of the National Security Advisor (NSA) has crystallised particularly regarding intelligence?

Subrahmanyam: The Kargil Committee Report mentions that previously two jobs were held by one person, but now that is no longer the case. The Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister is different from the NSA, but since the time of the setting up of the National Security Council (NSC), I was critical of the scheme that was implemented. The National Security Advisor in the US is a monitor, an agenda-setter and an advisor to the President. He is not an executive. Unfortunately, in India, the NSA has become an executive. The other issue is that the NSA should equip himself to carry out the other role, namely, monitor the decisions of the NSC as a reviewer of the resulting developments, something that has not been done according to me.

SP's: In your view, are conflicts like the one in Kargil likely to continue or do you see a change in Pakistan's basic strategic outlook?

Subrahmanyam: The most authoritative person whom I can quote on this question would have to be General Pervez Musharraf who says they will continue. I certainly cannot question his authority on this subject.

SP's: What would you say to convince us that there has been a change of heart?

Subrahmanyam: I would not question that. A General can initiate something, get defeated and then claim to be a man for peace. Therefore, the real issue is whether he is a man of peace out of instinct or out of compulsion.

SP's: What are the significant political and military lessons of the Kargil conflict?

Subrahmanyam: The most significant lesson would be that of eternal vigilance, given that we have an enemy who is looking for gaps in our preparedness at every given point in order to exploit it.